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Abstract 
We examine the prevalence of moral hazard on the Swedish dental market. Dentists can use 
their information advantage to induce demand but are constrained by patients’ ability to pay, 
suggesting that subsidies facilitate inducement. Furthermore, patients’ demand for dental care 
may increase under extensive subsidy following from decreased costs. In collaboration with 
dentists at TLV, we define a patient group that has the same dental need for two treatments, 
information and treatment of periodontal disease, but differ in subsidy level (50/85 percent) 
to analyze the relationship between subsidy level and treatment intensity. We use data for 83 
geographical regions for the years 2010-2012, and control for differences in socioeconomic 
and dental market specifics in the analysis. The results suggest that heavily subsidized 
patients are about 40 percent more intensively treated than less subsidized patients; either due 
to overtreatment of heavily subsidized patients or undertreatment of less subsidized patients. 
We argue that it is most likely due to overtreatment, emanating from demand inducement and 
moral hazard. 
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1. Introduction 
Dentists1 have more knowledge regarding dental care, quality of treatments and alternative 
treatments than patients, which implies that dentists have an information advantage on dental 
markets. If dentists use the information advantage to perform more dental treatments than the 
patient would have chosen having had the same information, it is a form of moral hazard 
referred to as supplier-induced demand (SID). The capacity to induce demand is constrained 
by patients’ ability to pay, suggesting that subsidies relax the constraint. Moral hazard from 
patients implies that a patient demands more and higher quality treatments than what is 
actually needed when the patient does not bear the full cost.2 
 
Moral hazard is a well-known phenomenon on dental markets. To reduce the risk of moral 
hazard on the Swedish dental market, where patients with large dental costs are subsidized by 
a high cost protection scheme, the Swedish Social Insurance Agency (SSIA) performs 
randomized and targeted ex-post controls of disbursements of subsidized treatments. A recent 
study states that the ex-post controls flaws in both the selection process and the following-up, 
and the question is whether the ex-post controls fails to prevent moral hazard. In our study, 
we examine this through analysing the relationship between subsidy level and treatment 
intensity. The results suggest that the subsidy of dental care leads to overtreatment of heavily 
subsidized patients. A revision of the high costs protection scheme, as well as an 
improvement of the ex-post controls, could thus lead to efficiency gains. 
 
Previous studies have found evidence of moral hazard and demand inducement on national 
dental markets,3 and Grönqvist (2006) finds indications of such on the Swedish dental market. 
To our knowledge, no study of moral hazard and SID has been performed since the latest 
dental reform of 2008 and we thereby contribute to previous literature with empirical 
evidence from the Swedish dental market. 
1.1 The Study 
The high cost protection scheme on the Swedish dental market provides financial support for 
individuals with a great need of dental care. The level of subsidy increases with dental costs; 
patients are subsidized with 50 percent of costs between 3 000 and 15 000 SEK and with 85                                                         
1 We refer to caregivers as dentists, even though dental hygienists can perform the treatments, since the term 
caregiver is a broad concept. 
2 Ex-post moral hazard. 
3 See for instance Grytten, Holst & Laake (1990), Birch (1988), Chalkley & Tilley (2006) 
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percent for costs exceeding 15 000 SEK.4 The costs are aggregated during a subsidy period 
that runs for twelve months after which it resets. 
 
Through defining a patient group5 that differ in subsidy level, but have similar dental health 
as well as similar dental need for two treatments; information to patient (311) and treatment 
of periodontal disease (342),6 we examine the relationship between subsidy level and 
treatment intensity of the two treatments. The data set is aggregated on 83 geographical 
regions constituted by the two first digits in the postal code,7 since data on individual dental 
health is not available due to secrecy. The data set consists of completed subsidy periods for 
the years 2010-2012, and is divided into clusters in the regions depending on caregiver type 
(private or public) and dental costs (10 000-15 000 or 15 000-35 000) and thus subsidy level. 
We estimate a Random Effects (RE) model, where the dependent variable is the mean number 
of treatment 311 or 342 separately, and control for socioeconomic and dental market specifics 
of a region. The variable of interest is a dummy variable taking the value of one if patients in 
a cluster have dental costs between 15 000 and 35 000 SEK, and thus are heavily subsidized. 
 
The results show that the subsidy leads to more treatments. Heavily subsidized patient receive 
on average about 49 percent more of treatment 311 (information to patient) and about 40 
percent more of treatment 342 (treatment of periodontal disease) compared to less subsidized 
patients. The results are statistically significant8 and imply either that heavily subsidized 
patients are overtreated or that less subsidized patients are undertreated. 
1.2 Discussion 
We argue that the difference in treatment intensity is most likely to be due to overtreatment of 
heavily subsidized patients. Compensation to the dentist or to the clinic is the same regardless 
of subsidy level, indicating that a potential undertreatment arises from patients’ financial 
constraints. The construction of the high cost protection scheme implies that the subsidy level 
increases with dental costs, suggesting that a patient that cannot afford the treatment when 
                                                        
4 The thresholds are based on reference prices set by TLV. Dentists are not bound by reference prices when 
setting their own prices. 
5 See Table 2.3 in Appendix 2.  Another patient group is also defined but due to missing values we disregard that 
group in the analysis (see Table 2.4 in Appendix 2). 
6 Treatment 605 (acrylic splint) and 604 (soft acrylic splint) were also selected, but due to a large share of 
missing values we disregard those treatment in the analysis. See Table 3.1 in Appendix 3. 
7 See Table 1.1 and Map 1.1 in Appendix 1. We also received data on county level, but due to lack of variation 
in the regions the results became vary sensitive (see Table 1.2 and map 1.2 in Appendix 1). 
8 On a ten percent level. 
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being subsidized with 50 percent should not be able to afford the treatment when being 
subsidized with 85 percent either; even though the marginal price of the treatment has 
decreased, the overall dental costs have increased.9  
 
The aim of the high cost protection scheme is to primarily allocate resources towards patients 
with the greatest dental care needs in order for them to receive dental care at reasonable cost 
(TLV 2012). An increase in treatment intensity is thus not the main purpose of the system. 
Heavily subsidized patients could experience some benefit from treatments 311 and 342, but 
the alternative cost of not using the funds more efficiently are likely to rule out the marginal 
benefit of the patients.  
 
Our data does not allow us to distinguish whether the overtreatment arises from SID or moral 
hazard from the patients, but the characteristics of the treatments can provide some guidance. 
According to dentists at the Dental and Pharmaceutical Benefits Agency (TLV), dentists are 
not very likely to ask for patients’ consent before performing treatment 311 (information to 
patient), nor can patients assess the need or quality of the treatment. This suggests that the 
increase in treatment intensity of treatment 311 is likely to be due to SID rather than moral 
hazard from patients. Concerning treatment 342, on the other hand, patients that have had 
previous experience of periodontitis may be able to assess the need for a treatment and 
demand more extensive treatments than actually needed when they are heavily subsidized. 
However, not all patients can assess the need, and even if the patient can, it is important to 
emphasize that it is the dentists that decides on a specific treatment. The increase in treatment 
intensity of treatment 342 can therefore be a combination of moral hazard from the patient 
and SID, but is not likely to occur only due to moral hazard from patient. 
 
The results of our study suggest that the subsidy of dental care leads to overtreatment, which 
in turn leads to welfare losses since more, or more extensive treatments than what are socially 
optimal is performed. This is an important finding since it indicates that the funds allocated 
towards the high cost protection scheme are not used in the best possible way. SSIA estimates 
that incorrect disbursements to dentists correspond to between 0.2 and 1.2 billions SEK, 
implying that there is a significant potential gain from more efficient ex-post controls and a 
revision of the high cost protection scheme. 
                                                        
9 See Tables 2.5 and 2.6, in Appendix 2, where the mechanism of the high cost protection scheme is described. 
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A weakness of the study is the use of aggregated data. The robustness of the results could be 
enhanced through the use of data on individual dental health and data on, for instance, 
patients’ home address and socioeconomic factors, the address of the dental clinic as well as 
remuneration systems of dentists. However, such data is not available to us due to secrecy 
considerations. 
 
The paper is organized as follows; the next section presents an overview of the dental care 
benefits scheme and describes the concepts of moral hazard and supplier-induced demand in 
more detail. After that, the theoretical and empirical model and data and methodology are 
presented. The concluding sections feature the results from the regression analysis and 
suggestion for future research. 
2. Dental Care Benefits Scheme 
The Swedish Dental Services Act (1985:125) states that dental care should be accessible on 
equal terms for the entire population and the government therefore intervenes on the Swedish 
dental market trough a dental care benefit scheme. The current dental care benefits scheme 
was implemented on the 1st of July 2008 and aims at maintaining good dental health for 
patients with minor dental care needs and provide financial support for patients with great 
dental care needs (ISF 2011:18). It consists of two parts; a general dental care grant10 and a 
high cost protection scheme, and is provided for dental care treatments completed as of the 
year the patient turns 20 years of age (SFS 2008:145).  
 
The high cost protection scheme subsidizes preventive dental care and dental care that is 
performed in order to give relief from pain and illnesses, give the patient ability to eat, chew 
and speak properly and provide an acceptable visual appearance (SFS 2008:145).11 The 
scheme enables patients with great dental care needs to receive dental care at a reasonable 
cost, since the government bears a part of the cost. The primary objective of the high cost 
protection scheme is to allocate resources towards patients with the greatest need of dental 
care and not to reduce costs for patients in general (TLV 2012). 
 
                                                        
10 300 SEK/year for patients aged 20-29 and 75+, 150 SEK/year for patients aged 30-74. 
11 For instance, teeth whitening is not a reimbursable treatment. 
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The subsidy thresholds in the high cost protection scheme are based on reference prices set by 
TLV, and not on the dentists’ price.12 The reference prices are in turn based on odontological 
methods that, according to science and experience, result in good dental outcomes at 
reasonable costs. Dentists are not bounded by reference prices when setting prices, but 
patients are entitled to know the cost of a treatment beforehand (SFS 1985:125).  
 
A patient pays the full price for total treatment costs with reference prices up to 3 000 SEK, 
above which the high cost protection scheme steps in. A patient is subsidized with: 
 
• 50 percent of dental costs with a reference price between 3 000 and 15 000 SEK 
• 85 percent of dental costs with a reference price exceeding 15 000 SEK13 
 
If a dentist sets a price above the reference price, the difference between the two prices is 
fully transferred to the patient. After performed treatment, a subsidized patient only pays the 
difference between the dentist’s price and the subsidy, and it is the dentist that reports to SSIA 
in order to be reimbursed with the subsidized amount. The dentist has to report a diagnosis 
together with performed treatment to prevent unjustified treatments (RiR 2012:12). A subsidy 
period runs for twelve months, under which dental costs for each dental treatment is 
aggregated, and then a new subsidy period begins.14 A dentist can on the request from a 
patient report a new period in the high cost protection scheme to SSIA before the prior period 
has ended (SFS 2008:145).  
 
Ex-post controls, which are based on random selection or on suspicions of incorrect 
disbursements, are performed after reimbursement in order to identify both intentional and 
unintentional errors in dentists’ reports to SSIA (IFS 2011:18). If an ex-post control reveals 
an incorrect disbursement, SSIA decides on repayments. Only the difference between the 
incorrect and the correct disbursement is reclaimed in cases where another reimbursable 
treatment has been carried out than the one reported to SSIA. Normally, repayments of 
incorrect disbursements are done by pairing-off future disbursements (ISF 2011:18), implying 
that a dentist who has reported incorrectly is not obliged to pay back a lump sum to SSIA. 
                                                         
12 Unless the dentists’ price is lower than the reference price. 
13 See Table 2.5 and Table 2.6 in Appendix 2 for further explanation. 
14 A subsidy period is thus not dependent on the calendar year. 
 9 
In a report from 2011, the Swedish Social Insurance Inspectorate (ISF) review the efficiency 
of ex-post controls and states that the system flaws in both the selection process and the 
follow-up of the ex-post controls (ISF 2011:18). SSIA estimates that between 5 and 25 
percent of the total disbursements can be incorrect, which is equivalent to between 0.2 and 1.2 
billions SEK, but decisions on repayments only correspond to about one percent of all 
disbursements. This implies that there is a significant potential gain from an efficiency 
improvement of the ex-post controls.15 ISF also concludes that there are few possible 
sanctions if SSIA suspect that a dentist has reported incorrectly with intention to deceive the 
scheme; SSIA could file a police report, but between July 2008 and October 2011, only six 
police reports were filed out of which none led to conviction. ISF argues that the small 
probability of being ex-post controlled together with few sanctions of reporting incorrectly 
provides dentists with weak financial incentives to report correctly. 
3. Moral Hazard and Supplier-Induced Demand (SID) 
The dental market is characterized by asymmetric information, where dentists have an 
information advantage about diagnosis, appropriate treatments and expected price and quality 
(SOU 2007:19). Even after completed treatment, it is hard to assess the quality of a treatment 
for a patient. Patients delegate the treatment decision to the dentist and merely decide whether 
to follow the dentist’s advice or not, but the patient is not fully sovereign even in this decision 
since the patient relies on the dentist’s competence. Factors that usually influence the choice 
of the consumer, as price and quality, do not seem to have a significant impact on the dental 
market; instead, trust in the dentist appears to play a major role (Grönqvist 2006).  
 
Dentists can use the information advantage to perform more dental treatments than the patient 
would have chosen having had the same information in order to secure a high volume of 
business. This is referred to as supplier-induced demand (SID). The capacity to induce 
demand is constrained by patients’ ability to pay, implying that SID is facilitated if patients 
are covered by a comprehensive health insurance or subsidy (Zweifel, Breyer & Kifmann 
2009).16 Previous research suggests that remuneration systems such as the high cost 
protection scheme, where dentists are reimbursed on a per treatment basis, can result in SID.17 
                                                         
15 During 2011, less than 3 % of the disbursement from the dental care benefits scheme was ex-post controlled 
(ISF 2011:18). 
16 Alternative cost associated with dental treatments still has to be considered. 
17 See for instance Iversen and Lurås (2000), Sørensen and Grytten (2003), Ellis and McGuire (1986) 
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Graph I: Mechanism of SID 
 
Source: Dalin & Wolff, 2013  
 
In Graph I, the mechanism of SID is described. The x-axis measures the quantity of 
treatments and the y-axis measures compensation to the dentists. S1 represents the dental 
supply from dentists when patients have a lower subsidy level and S2 represents the dental 
supply from dentists when patients have a higher subsidy level. The compensation to the 
dentist of a performed treatment is fixed, but the price paid by the patient differs with the 
subsidy level. D1 represents the dental demand for patients with a lower subsidy level and D2 
represents the dental demand for patients with a higher subsidy level, and the demand curves 
are to a great extent determined by dentists. Given that the socially optimal amount is 
supplied in point A, the increase in demand due to demand inducement is the shift from point 
A to point B (Q1 to Q2). Even though the compensation of a treatment to the dentist is the 
same in point A and B, the quantity increases by ∆Q when the subsidy increases, indicating 
that the total compensation increases. 
 
Two kinds of moral hazard can arise from patients; ex-ante and ex-post. Ex-post moral hazard 
refers to when patients demand more and higher quality treatment when they do not bear the 
full cost and ex-ante moral hazard refers to when patients become incautious with dental care 
when they do not bear the full costs (Arrow, 1970). Ex-ante moral hazard is not likely to 
occur in this setting since a subsidy period only runs for 12 months after which it resets. 
Patients that neglect dental health during one subsidy period will thereby increase the 
probability of dental outlays in the next subsidy period,18 as well as experience alternative 
costs and possible discomfort. In this paper, we focus on ex-post moral hazard, simply 
referred to as moral hazard. The mechanism of moral hazard is the same as that of a 
downward sloping demand curve; demand increase when prices decrease. However, the                                                         
18 Patients pay the full costs up to 3 000 SEK in reference prices, before the high cost protection scheme steps in. 
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incentives of patients may have less effect than the incentives of dentists, since dentists are in 
control of cost and treatments. SID and moral hazard results in welfare losses since more, or 
more extensive, dental care than what is socially optimal is performed. 
4. Model Specification  
4.1 Theoretical Model 
We assume that dentists seek to maximize the utility of treating a patient and that the utility 
function of dentists depends on income and treatment intensity, U Y (t),t( ). The marginal 
utility of income is increasing with decreasing speed, whilst treatment intensity is costly in 
terms of time but has a positive effect on the income of a clinic or a self-employed dentist as 
well as an altruistic value for the dentists (Chalkley & Tilley 2006). The treatment intensity is 
constrained by patients’ ability to pay, indicating that the constraint is relaxed when patients 
are heavily subsidized, which facilitate SID (Zweifel et al. 2009). 
 
The utility function of patients is dependent on the health state the patient is in. Jacob and 
Lundin (2005) assume that the utility of an individual in poor health depends on consumption 
for general goods and consumption of medical care, U c,m( ), which both have a positive 
marginal utility. Heavily subsidized patient can consume more dental care than less 
subsidized patients when consuming the same amount of general goods, given that the 
patients have the same income in a period. Since an increase in dental care consumption leads 
to an increase in utility, patients have incentives to demand more and higher quality dental 
treatments when being covered by an extensive subsidy, i.e. moral hazard. 
4.2 Empirical Strategy 
In order to investigate how the subsidy level influences treatment intensity, a patient group is 
defined in collaboration with dentist at TLV. Within the group, the patients have had many 
less extensive treatments (see Appendix 2, Table 2.3) and have similar dental health. The 
patients have dental costs in two reference price spans during a completed subsidy period, 
where patients in the lower span have dental costs between 10 000 and 15 000 SEK (50 
percent subsidy), and patient in the upper span have dental costs between 15 000 and 35 000 
SEK (85 percent subsidy). The sizes of the price spans are chosen to ensure that the patients 
in the group are comparable. To analyze difference in treatment intensity, two treatments are 
selected for further analysis, 311 (information to patient) and 342 (treatment of periodontal 
disease), defined in Table I below. The treatments are selected since the dental need for the 
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two treatments are similar in the patient group regardless of subsidy level. The extra patient 
costs of the treatments is very small under extensive subsidy compared to total dental costs, as 
can be seen in Table I. 
 
Table I: Definition and price of treatment 311 and 342 
  
Treatment  Definition Description 
Ref. price 
(2011) 
50 % 
subsidy 
85 % 
subsidy 
311 Information to 
patient  
Information about causality and dental 
hygiene, instructions concerning self-
care etc. The treatment is reimbursable 
once per patient, day and caregiver. 
 
370 SEK 185 SEK 56 SEK 
342 Treatment of 
periodontal 
disease 
Treatment of periodontal disease or peri-
implantatis, more extensive.  Often 
performed by a dental hygienist. The 
treatment is reimbursable once per 
patient, day and caregiver.  
720 SEK 360 SEK 108 SEK 
Source: TLVFS (2011:2) 
 
The data set is aggregated on 83 geographical areas constituted by the first two digits in the 
postal code. Because of the Public Access to Information and Secrecy Act (2009:400), data on 
individual dental health is not available to us. Within each region, the patients are divided into 
clusters depending firstly on the reference price span, and secondly on whether patients have 
been treated by public or private dentist or by both. This result in six clusters in every region, 
and each cluster is treated as one observation that is observed for the years 2010, 2011 and 
2012.19 There is a minimum of three patients in each reported cluster, and clusters with less 
than three individuals are reported as missing values. Since the dental need for treatment 311 
and 342 is the same, regardless of dental costs and thus subsidy level, there should not be a 
significant difference in treatment intensity between clusters. To investigate if there is a 
difference, we perform a regression analysis. 
4.2.1 Empirical Model 
The regression model is defined in Equation 1: 
 
Yit =α +β1subsidyit +β2 privateit +β3itemit +β4 priceit
+γ 'dentistit +θ
'socioeconomicit +ϑ
'regionalit +εit
                        [1] 
 
                                                        
19 For instance; patients that have visited a dentist in postal code 11, have dental costs between 15 000 and  
35 000 (85 percent subsidy), have been treated by a private dentist and have a completed subsidy period in 2010. 
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where it refers to patient cluster i , in time t  and Yit  denotes the log of mean number of 
treatment 311 or 342 respectively. 
 
subsidyit  is a dummy variable taking the value of one if patients in cluster i have dental costs 
between 15 000 and 35 000 SEK in time t, and zero otherwise. The variable is our variable of 
interest and if β1  is positive and significant this implies that heavily subsidized patients on an 
average receive more of treatment 311 or 342 respectively than less subsidized patients. 
Given the definition of the patient group, and thus no correlation between subsidy level and 
dental need for treatment 311 and 342, this indicates that there is a difference in treatment 
intensity as a consequence of the subsidy. 
 
privateit is a dummy variable taking the value of one if private dentists exclusively have 
treated patients in a cluster. If β2  is positive and significant it indicates that private dentists 
treat patients more intensively compared to public and mixed caregivers.20 
 
itemit  is log of the mean number of total treatments performed in a cluster during a subsidy 
period. The variable is included to control for an overall increase in dental treatments. 
priceit is log of the mean amount of the total reference price in a cluster that exceeds 3 000 
SEK and thus falls within the high cost protection scheme during a subsidy period. The 
variable is included to control for dental costs. 
 
dentistit is a matrix that refers to dental specifics in a postal code (log of practices per 1 000 
inhabitants and log share of private dentist) to account for competition and alternative cost.21 
Previous studies have shown that competition on dental markets leads to an increase in dental 
treatments (Grytten, Holst & Laake 1990). However, Birch (1988) argues that a fall in access 
cost, i.e. an increase in practices per 1 000 inhabitants, imply that individuals can visit the 
dentist more frequently and have more preventive dental care, which leads to a decrease in 
dental need and thereby a decrease in treatments. The log share of private dentists is included 
to account for the dentist structure of a region. It is likely that regions with a high share of 
private dentists also have a high practice density and thereby a higher level of regional 
competition, since sparsely populated regions often have few and mostly public dentists.                                                         
20 Mixed caregiver: both private and public dentists have treated patient.  21 Such as time costs and travelling cost etc. 
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socioeconomicit  and regionalit are matrices including socioeconomic and region specific 
variables. The log of the mean income in a region accounts for patients’ ability to pay. A high 
income can lead to an increase in the number of visits to the dentist, leading to good dental 
health (Tuominen & Eriksson, 2001). Education is known to be correlated with health status, 
and we include share of the adult population with tertiary or higher education in the region. 
The mean age and mean age squared in a region accounts for demographics. Older people 
may have a greater need for dental care, but the increased demand due to a higher age is 
diminishing. Previous studies have shown that males are more intensively treated than 
females (Chalkley & Tilley, 2006). To account for this, the log share of females in a cluster is 
included. 
 
The log share of inhabitants born outside of Sweden in a region accounts for cultural 
differences in dental hygiene. In 2007, 30 percent of individuals born outside of Europe 
reported that they had bad or very bad dental health, compared to only 9 percent of 
individuals born in Sweden (The National Board of Health and Welfare, 2010). Moreover, the 
log of the perceived dental health in postal codes is included. 
 
The log net cost of dental care22 in the county council/councils controls for the dental care 
administration in a region and the log of county/counties tax rate is included to control for the 
political rule. In addition, a dummy variable that takes the value of one if the region includes 
one of the major cities in Sweden is included to control for the characteristics of large cities. 
23
                                                        
22 Log of deficit for a county council, measured in millions of SEK. 
23 Stockholm, Göteborg and Malmö. 
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Table II: Descriptive statistics24 
Variables Definition Region level Expected sign Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Data source 
Dependent        
Treatment 311 Mean number if treatment 311 in cluster Postal code 1 100 0.42 0.29 SSIA 
Treatment 342 Mean number of treatment 342 in cluster Postal code 1 273 0.82 0.43 SSIA 
Independent        
50 % subsidy (A1) Dummy variable, equals 1 if patients in cluster have dental costs between  
10 000 and 15 000 SEK 
Postal code - 1 506 0.51 0.50 SSIA 
85 % subsidy (A2) Dummy variable, equals 1 if patients in cluster have dental costs between 
15 000 and 35 000 SEK 
Postal code + 1 506 0.49 0.50 SSIA 
Mean treatment Mean number of treatments of patients in cluster Postal code + 1 427 16.14 3.28 SSIA 
Share female Share of females in cluster Postal code - 1 230 0.46 0.09 SSIA 
Private Dummy variable, equals 1 if patients in cluster solely treated by private dentist Postal code + 1 506 0.35 0.48 SSIA 
Price Mean amount of total dental cost in cluster within the high cost protection 
scheme 
Postal code + /- 1 427 15 026 3 430 SSIA 
Practice density No. of practices per 1 000 inhabitants in postal code Postal code + /- 1 435 0.31 0.13 Cegedim 
Share private 
dentists 
Share of private dentists in postal code Postal code + 1 435 0.48 0.14 Cegedim 
Mean age Mean age in postal code. 2011 is used as a proxy for 2010 and 2012 Postal code + 1 506 48.01 2.30 InsightOne Nordic 
Mean income Mean income in postal code. 2011 is used as a proxy for 2010 and 2012 Postal code + /- 1 473 251 868 32 172 InsightOne Nordic 
Education Share of the adult population with tertiary or higher education in postal code. 
2011 is used as proxy for 2010 and 2012 
Postal code - 1 473 0.25 0.09 InsightOne Nordic 
Ethnicity Share of the population born outside of Sweden in postal code. 2011 is used as 
proxy for 2010 and 2012 
Postal code + 1 506 0.11 0.06 InsightOne Nordic 
Population density Population density. 2011 is used as proxy for 2010 and 2012 Postal code +/- 1 473 345 980 InsightOne Nordic / 
SCB 
Dental health Share of population in county reported to have bad or vary bad dental health. 
Estimation for postal code. 2011 used as a proxy for 2010 and 2012 
County + 1 473 9.70 1.07 Swedish National 
Institute of Public 
Health 
Tax rate Tax rate in county. Estimation for postal code County - 1 491 10.62 1.28 SCB 
Dental deficit Deficit for dental care in county measured in millions, pharmaceutical expenses 
excluded. Estimated for postal code. 2011 used as a proxy for 2010 and 2012 
 
County + 1 473 12.45 16.50 Swedish Association 
of Local Authorities 
and Regions 
Big city Dummy variable, equals 1 if one of three major cities is located in postal code Postal code + 1 473 0.17 0.38 Own estimation                                                         
24 For descriptive statistics for patient group B, and patient group A and B on county level, see Appendix 5. 
5. Data and Methodology 
5.1 Data 
SSIA provided data on the number of treatments 311 (information to patient) and 342 
(treatment of periodontal disease) in each cluster as well as the total number of treatments 
performed during a subsidy period. We also received data on the total aggregated amount of 
reference prices within the high cost protection scheme during a subsidy period, as well as the 
caregiver type, and the number of individuals and females in each cluster. 
 
For definition and data sources of control variables, see Table II above.  
5.2 Limitations of the Data 
A problem can arise if dentists charge different prices when patients are subsidized with 50 
percent compared to 85 percent. This can bias the results of the analysis, since patients may 
not experience the expected decrease in prices, indicating that the effect of the subsidy is not 
as apparent. We cannot control for this given our data, but argue that it is not likely that 
dentists change prices dependent on subsidy level in a systematic way, since dental clinics 
have price lists and dentists are obliged to inform patients about the cost of a treatment 
beforehand. 
 
The postal code regions cannot be considered as separate or independent markets, which 
imply that it is hard to control for competition. It is likely that people that live just outside of a 
city work in the city or regularly visit it, and therefore visit the dentists in another postal code 
than where they live.25 In our data set, 18 percent of the patients have visited dentist in more 
than one postal code. The control variables for a postal code region may therefore not be 
applicable to the patients in that postal code. 
 
The control variables are included as an average of the postal codes, but since the 
geographical areas are quite large the variables may not mirror the environment for all 
patients in the region. In addition, there is no variation between clusters within the same 
postal code in one year. The lack of variation in the data can lead to sensitive regression 
results.                                                          
25 For instance, the cities of Gävle, Sundsvall and Norrköping constitute their own two-digit postal code areas, 
but are surrounded on all sides by another two-digit postal code area. 
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Our data does not allow us to differentiate between the effects of moral hazard from the 
patients and supplier-induced demand with certainty.26 The dimensions of the data imply that 
we have to be cautious when making inferences and suggest policy implications. 
5.3 Econometric Approach 
The data set contains information both across time (2010-2012) and across patient clusters. 
Such a data set is referred to as panel data and implies that we can investigate how variables 
and the relationship between them alter over time (Brooks, 2008). Some of the clusters in the 
data set are not observed for all years, for instance if it is less than three individuals in a 
cluster in one year, which implies that our data set is unbalanced. 
One simple way to deal with panel data is to treat it as cross-sectional and run a simple 
Ordinary Least Square (OLS) model. The coefficient estimates are then assumed to be the 
same across time periods and patient clusters (Brooks, 2008). For the estimates to be 
consistent and unbiased in the OLS model, the error terms must be uncorrelated. This is not 
very likely since we repeatedly observe clusters in the same regions, which indicate that the 
OLS model is prone to be inefficient. In addition, the dependency of the observations makes it 
reasonable to assume that there can be unobservable region specific factors, as for instance an 
ambitious and driven population that can influence the need for dental care. A failure to 
control for this makes OLS inconsistent. 
 
One way to control for unobservable region specific factors is to use the Random Effects (RE) 
model.27 Hedeker, Gibbons and Flay (1994) argue that the Random Effects (RE) model 
provides a powerful tool for analysis of aggregated data when the number of individuals in 
clusters differs. In the setting with aggregated data, individual differences are lost and the data 
cannot be analyzed in a simple way. The RE model is then effective since it estimates and 
adjust for the within variation of the data and takes into account that the observations are not 
independent. The model is estimated through applying OLS on a transformed version of the 
data. It is assumed that there are unobservable regions specific effects but that the effects are 
random and not fixed. Under this assumption, the RE model is more suitable for our data set 
than the OLS model. The prevalence of region specific effects can be tested for by using the                                                         
26 See for instance Barros, Machado and Sanz-de-Galdeano (2008)  
27 The Fixed Effects (FE) model can also be used. The FE model allows for correlation between unobservable 
region specific effects and the explanatory variables. However, the transformation of the data implies that we 
cannot interpret the effect of our variable of interest since it is a dummy variable. We argue that the RE model is 
more applicable on our data set. 
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Breusch-Pagan Lagrange multiplier test, where a rejection of the null hypothesis of no 
random effects indicates that the RE model is more suitable for the data.28  
Given the dimensions of our data set, we argue that unobservable region specific effects are 
likely to be random and vary over time. The main argument for this is that the regions are 
quite large and the characteristics of individual patients may differ a lot within a region. 
Patients in the sample could all possess individual time invariant characteristics that influence 
the need for dental care, but since they are grouped together in clusters these characteristics 
do not have the same impact as it would have had with individual data. In addition, 
individuals in a cluster differ between years since the data consists of completed subsidy 
periods, and thus individual time invariant characteristics may not prevail from one year to 
another. This imply that a RE model is a suitable model for our data set. In the same way as 
Birch (1988), who uses region specific data to estimate if financial incentives of the 
remuneration system lead to SID, we include region specific variables to control for 
observable region specific effects. 
6. Results 
The descriptive statistics in Graph II and III show that patients with dental costs in the upper 
reference price span with a higher subsidy level on an average receive more of treatments 311 
(information to patient) and 342 (treatment of periodontal disease) than patients with dental 
costs in the lower reference price span with a lower subsidy level.29 However, we seek to 
investigate if the subsidy of dental care affects treatment intensity and without controlling for 
other factors that is likely to influence treatment intensity we cannot disentangle the impact of 
the subsidy level from just looking at the graphs. For instance, patients with dental costs in the 
upper reference price spans, i.e. with higher subsidy, could have received more treatments on 
an average and therefore also more of treatment 311 or 342 than patients in the lower 
reference price span with a lower subsidy.  
 
                                                        
28 See Appendix 4 for more detailed description of the econometric technique.  
29 This is also the case for treatment 604 and 605, in patient group A and B, and for the county level data (Table 
3.2 and Table 3.3 in Appendix 3). 
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Graph II: Mean number of 311 in patient clusters for the years 2010-2012 
 
Source: SSIA (2013) 
Note: “50 % subsidy” refers to patients with dental costs in the span 10 000-15 000 SEK and  
“85 % subsidy” refers to patients with dental costs in the span 15 000-35 000 SEK 
 
Graph III:  Mean number of 342 in patient clusters for the years 2010-2012 
 
Source: SSIA (2013) 
Note: “50 % subsidy” refers to patients with dental costs in the span 10 000-15 000 SEK and  
“85 % subsidy” refers to patients with dental costs in the span 15 000-35 000 SEK 
 
The regression analysis is performed using a RE model that is run with cluster robust standard 
errors to control for serial correlation and heteroskedasticity. The Breusch-Pagan Lagrange 
multiplier test rejects the null hypothesis, indicating that the RE model is better suited for our 
data than the OLS model. The results are presented in Table IV below.30 
                                                        
30 The results for the regression analysis on county level data are presented in Table 6.1 and 6.2 in Appendix 6. 
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Table IV: Regression results: RE and OLS 
Dependent variable: log of mean number of treatment 311 and 342 in a cluster 
 RE_311 RE_342    OLS_311 OLS_342    
  robust s.e. robust s.e. robust s.e. robust s.e. 
85 % subsidy (A2) 0.490* 0.403* 0.545 0.348    
 (0.28) (0.24) (0.35) (0.24)    
Share female (log) 0.137 -0.008 0.166 0.030    
 (0.09) (0.08) (0.12) (0.09)    
Mean treatment (log) 3.084*** 2.175*** 4.399*** 2.435*** 
 (0.42) (0.30) (0.42) (0.31)    
Price (log) -2.650*** -2.269*** -3.852*** -2.348*** 
 (0.73) (0.57) (0.89) (0.59)    
Mean age -1.101 0.343 -1.475** 0.436    
 (0.79) (0.60) (0.64) (0.47)    
Mean age squared 1.102 -0.320 1.462** -0.422    
 (0.82) (0.62) (0.66) (0.49)    
Ethnicity (log) 0.166 0.349*** 0.125 0.342*** 
 (0.12) (0.08) (0.11) (0.06)    
Tax rate (log) 3.030*** -0.674 1.967** 0.165    
 (0.80) (0.69) (0.88) (0.64)    
Education -1.301 0.157 -2.241** -0.065    
 (1.17) (0.81) (0.95) (0.63)    
Mean income (log) 0.774 2.569*** 1.005 2.419*** 
 (1.21) (0.79) (0.90) (0.61)    
Big city -0.240 -0.144 -0.228 -0.135    
 (0.19) (0.12) (0.14) (0.10)    
Share private dentist 0.477 0.311 0.282 0.201    
 (0.40) (0.29) (0.30) (0.23)    
Practice density (log) -0.585*** 0.082 -0.557*** 0.055    
 (0.22) (0.15) (0.16) (0.11)    
Private 0.012 -0.086* 0.135** -0.067    
 (0.08) (0.05) (0.06) (0.04)    
Population density (log) 0.073 0.002 0.063* 0.017    
 (0.05) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03)    
Dental deficit (log) -0.011 -0.079*** -0.015 -0.082*** 
 (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)    
Dental health (log) 0.564 -0.257 0.513** -0.322*  
 (0.35) (0.25) (0.26) (0.18)    
Constant 24.606 -22.664* 42.216*** -24.613**   
  (17.29) (13.26) (14.63) (10.92)  
sigma_u 0.43 0.31   
sigma_e 0.37 0.32   
Rho  0.57 0.49     
Breusch-Pagan LM test,  
p-value 0.000 0.000   
Note: *** indicates significant on a one percent level, ** indicates significant on a five percent level,  
* indicates significant on a ten percent level. 
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The following section presents the results from the RE model; only variables significant on a 
10 percent level and significant for both treatment 311 and 342 are commented on and the 
effects of the coefficient estimates are described as ceteris paribus. 
 
The results shows that patients who have dental costs in the upper reference price span, and 
thus are subsidized with 85 percent of the reference price, on an average receive 49 percent 
more of treatment 311 than patients who have dental costs in the lower reference price span, 
and thus are subsidized with 50 percent of the reference price. The corresponding figure for 
the mean number of treatment 342 is 40 percent. The results suggest that the treatment 
intensity of 311 (information to patient) and 342 (treatment of periodontal disease) increase 
when the subsidy level increase. Since the dental need for treatment 311 and 342 is similar 
regardless of subsidy level given the definition of the patient group, the differences in 
treatment intensity cannot be explained by differences in dental need. 
 
The estimated coefficient for the log of the mean number of total treatments indicates that a 
one percent increase in the mean number of total treatments results in a 3.1 percent increase in 
the mean number of treatment 311 and a 2.2 percent increase in the mean number of treatment 
342. This implies that the more dental treatments a patient receives, the more likely is it that 
the patient also receives treatment 311 and 342. 
 
If the amount of the reference price that falls within the high cost protection scheme increase 
with one percent, the mean number of treatment 311 decrease with 2.7 percent and the mean 
number of treatment 342 decrease with 2.3 percent in a cluster. The negative effect that the 
price has on treatment intensity is likely to be due to increased costs. However, it cannot be 
considered as a change in patient demand since dentists may not consult patients prior to 
performing the treatment. 
 
As can be seen in Table IV, some of the control variables in the analysis are significant for 
one of the treatments but not for the other. This is reasonable since the characteristics of the 
treatments differ as well as the price level. 
7. Future Research 
Our results show that the subsidy of dental care leads to overtreatment of two specific 
treatments; 311 (information to patient) and 342 (treatment of periodontal disease). The 
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results are not general, but emphasize the importance of future research on the topic since 
overtreatment results in welfare losses. 
 
With more information of dentists’ remuneration system, and potential turnover requirements 
for the clinics, one can investigate if there is a link between the remuneration of dentists and 
treatment intensity. Such an analysis would investigate the prevalence of SID on the Swedish 
dental market. In addition, individual level data on dental health and socioeconomic factors as 
well as dentists’ specifics would enhance the analysis. If one could define dental markets 
narrowly, and get access to the home addresses of patients and the addresses of dental clinics, 
the competition can be controlled for. Such an analysis can provide more reliable and robust 
results on which policy implications can be based. However, it could be problematic to access 
such data due to ethical concerns. 
 
There is a possibility that dentists perform less costly treatments on less subsidized patients 
compared to heavily subsidized patients to treat the same diagnosis. If future research finds 
evidence of such, this would be a strong indication of moral hazard and/or supplier-induced 
demand. In addition, it would be very interesting to investigate if there are differences in 
treatment intensity between the months of a subsidy period. If there are signs that heavily 
subsidized patients receive significantly more treatments in the latter part of the subsidy 
period, i.e., just before the subsidy period ends, this can be an indication of moral hazard 
and/or supplier-induced demand. 
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9. Appendix 
9.1 Appendix 1 – Geographical Regions 
Postal code 
 
Table 1.1: Two-digit postal code, population, area and county 
Postal code  Population Area km2 County 
11 311 468 51 Stockholm 
12 308 928 102 Stockholm 
13 244 754 2 974 Stockholm 
14 216 165 1 253 Stockholm 
15 94 607 885 Stockholm, Södermanland 
16 240 407 83 Stockholm 
17 165 182 474 Stockholm 
18 220 140 1 194 Stockholm 
19 164 104 824 Stockholm, Uppsala 
21 281 866 150 Skåne 
22 84 879 115 Skåne 
23 144 001 867 Skåne 
24 135 903 1 793 Skåne 
25 118 152 339 Skåne 
26 188 354 2 088 Halland, Skåne 
27 93 893 1 948 Skåne 
28 102 771 3 455 Halland, Kronoberg, Skåne 
29 120 609 2 273 Blekinge, Kronoberg, Skåne 
30 77 313 523 Halland 
31 88 293 3 752 Halland, Jönköping, Kronoberg, Skåne, Västra Götaland  
33 71 489 2 943 Halland, Jönköping, Kronoberg, Västra Götaland 
34 61 925 4 002 Halland, Jönköping, Kronoberg, Skåne  
35 64 626 541 Kronoberg 
36 56 576 5 108 Blekinge, Jönköping, Kalmar, Kronoberg  
37 123 042 3 123 Blekinge, Kalmar, Kronoberg  
38 77 805 5 677 Kalmar, Kronoberg  
39 48 537 701 Kalmar 
41 303 375 148 Västra Götaland 
42 202 501 417 Halland, Västra Götaland  
43 263 678 2 382 Halland, Västra Götaland  
44 174 943 2 317 Västra Götaland 
45 115 823 4 530 Västra Götaland 
46 129 534 3 332 Västra Götaland 
47 41 220 1 024 Västra Götaland 
50 73 395 327 Västra Götaland 
51 91 484 3 677 Halland, Jönköping, Västra Götaland 
52 76 122 3 146 Jönköping, Västra Götaland 
53 85 228 3 097 Västra Götaland 
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54 115 963 5 073 Jönköping, Värmland, Västra Götaland, Örebro 
55 66 874 301 Jönköping 
56 90 018 3 230 Jönköping, Västra Götaland 
57 157 558 9 621 Jönköping, Kalmar, Kronoberg, Östergötland 
58 124 126 752 Östergötland 
59 179 301 10 380 Jönköping, Kalmar, Örebro, Östergötland 
60 102 074 379 Östergötland 
61 142 338 7 120 Kalmar, Stockholm, Södermanland, Örebro, Östergötland 
62 57 222 4 887 Gotland 
63 81 027 841 Södermanland, Västmanland 
64 116 074 4 708 Stockholm, Södermanland, Uppsala, Örebro, Östergötland 
65 73 917 493 Värmland 
66 100 286 8 088 Värmland, Västra Götaland 
67 45 114 4 601 Värmland, Västra Götaland 
68 80 660 11 416 Dalarna, Värmland 
69 92 101 3 714 Värmland, Västra Götaland, Örebro, Östergötland  
70 121 073 695 Örebro 
71 65 942 4 855 Värmland, Västmanland, Örebro 
72 130 548 1 198 Uppsala, Värmland 
73 120 232 4 777 Dalarna, Södermanland, Uppsala, Västmanland, Örebro 
74 145 170 6 866 Stockholm, Uppsala, Västmanland 
75 161 826 687 Uppsala 
76 53 004 3 731 Stockholm, Uppsala 
77 73 845 4 550 Dalarna, Gävleborg, Västmanland, Örebro 
78 87 976 8 764 Dalarna, Värmland 
79 115 114 17 446 Dalarna, Gävleborg, Jämtland 
80 76 875 825 Gävleborg 
81 95 069 6 575 Dalarna, Gävleborg, Uppsala 
82 129 109 15 401 Dalarna, Gävleborg, Jämtland 
83 99 500 30 882 Jämtland, Västerbotten, Västernorrland 
84 35 813 25 345 Gävleborg, Jämtland,Västernorrland 
85 54 768 273 Västernorrland 
86 58 741 4 338 Gävleborg, Jämtland, Västernorrland 
87 43 836 3 453 Västernorrland 
88 21 831 6 607 Jämtland, Västernorrland 
89 55 180 7 160 Västerbotten, Västernorrland 
90 95 479 1 582 Västerbotten 
91 54 579 20 375 Jämtland, Västerbotten, Västernorrland 
92 29 118 27 126 Norrbotten, Västerbotten 
93 89 138 32 900 Norrbotten, Västerbotten 
94 49 276 5 810 Norrbotten, Västerbotten 
95 47 947 11 440 Norrbotten 
96 32 294 22 348 Norrbotten 
97 61 546 2 473 Norrbotten 
98 48 165 46 536 Norrbotten 
Source: Postnummerservice AB 
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Map 1.2: Sweden, divided into two-digit postal code regions 
 
 
Source: Post och Telestyrelsen AB 
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County 
 
Table 1.2: County, population and area 
County 
 
Population 2011 Area km2 2011 
Blekinge 152 979 2 946.7 
Dalarna 276 565 28 196.8 
Gotland 57 308 3 151.4 
Gävleborg 276 130 18 200.2 
Halland 301 724 5 461.6 
Jämtland 126 299 49 343.1 
Jönköping 337 896 10 494.6 
Kalmar 233 090 11 219.1 
Kronoberg 184 654  8468 
Norrbotten 248 545 9 8249 
Skåne 1 252 933 11 035.4 
Stockholm 2 091 473 6 519.3 
Södermanland 272 563 6 103.1 
Uppsala 338 630 8 208.4 
Värmland 272 736 17 591.3 
Västerbotten 259 667 55 189.7 
Västernorrland 242 155 21 684.5 
Västmanland 254 257 5 144.9 
Västra Götaland 1 590 604 23 956.1 
Örebro 281 572 8 546.3 
Östergötland 431 075 10 604.6 
Source: SCB 
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Map 1.2: Sweden, divided on county 
 
 
 
 
Source: Länsstyrelsen 
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9.2 Appendix 2 – Definition and Prices 
 
Dental treatments 
 
Table 2.1: Definition of dental treatment series 
 
Source: TLVFS (2011:2) 
 
Table 2.2: Definitions of treatments 
Treatment Definition 
Reference 
price,    2011 
50% 
subsidy 
85% 
subsidy 
311 Information, instruction in case of illness 370 SEK 185 SEK 56 SEK 
342 Treatment of periodontal disease or peri-
implantitis, more extensive 
720 SEK 360 SEK 108 SEK 
604 Soft acrylic splint, laboratory produced 2 060 SEK 1 030 SEK  309 SEK 
605 Acrylic splint, laboratory produced 3 240 SEK 1 620 SEK 486 SEK 
Source: TLVFS (2011:2) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Reimbursable 
treatment-
series  Definition 
100 Examination, risk assessment  
and health promoting measures 
200 Illness preventive measures 
300 Illness treatment measures 
400 Surgical procedures 
500 Root canal treatments 
600 Dentition measures 
700 Restorative measures 
800 Prosthetic measures 
900 Orthodontic and replacement 
measures 
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Patient group A 
Table 2.3: Definition of patient group A 
A1: 10 000-15 000 A2: 15 000-35 000 
At least 7 treatments 
 
At least 7 treatments 
Maximum one 801 (dental crown), no 
other treatment in the 800-series can 
occur 
 
Maximum one 801 (dental crown), no 
other treatment in the 800-series can 
occur 
Treatments from the 100-, 300-, 500-, 
and 700-series can occur 
 
Treatments from the 100-, 300-, 500-, 
and 700-series can occur 
Treatments from the 400-series can 
occur, besides 421-430 
 
Treatments from the 400-series can 
occur, besides 421-430 
Treatments 311 (information), 342 
(treatment of periodontal disease), 604 
(soft acrylic splint) and 605 (acrylic 
splint) can occur in unlimited amount 
Treatments 311 (information), 342 
(treatment of periodontal disease), 604 
(soft acrylic splint) and 605 (acrylic 
splint) can occur in unlimited amount 
Source: Dentists at TLV (2013) 
Note: Implant measures cannot occur (in neither group A nor group B) and the patient groups only consist of 
completed subsidy periods for the years 2010, 2011 and 2012 
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Patient group B 
Table 2.4: Definition of patient group B 
A1: 10 000-15 000 A2: 15 000-35 000 
Must have one, maximum two 801 
(dental crown) 
 
Must have 2, maximum four 801 
(dental crown) 
Maximum two 802/803 (pin tooth) or 
one 822/823 (denture, dental plate) 
Maximum four 8 (pin tooth) or one 
822/823 (denture, dental plate) 
 
Maximum two treatments from the 
700-series can occur 
 
Maximum two treatments from the 
700-series can occur 
Occasional treatments from the 200-, 
300-series can occur 
 
Occasional treatments from the 200-, 
300-series can occur 
Occasional treatments from the 400-
series can occur, besides 421-430 
 
Occasional treatments from the 400-
series can occur, besides 421-430 
Treatments from the 100-series can 
occur 
 
Treatments from the 100-series can 
occur 
Treatments 501-504 (root canal) 
cannot occur 
 
Treatments 501-504 (root canal) 
cannot occur 
Treatments 311 (information), 342 
(treatment of periodontal disease), 604 
(soft acrylic splint) and 605 (acrylic 
splint) can occur in unlimited amount 
Treatments 311 (information), 342 
(treatment of periodontal disease), 604 
(soft acrylic splint) and 605 (acrylic 
splint) can occur in unlimited amount 
Source: Dentists at TLV (2013) 
Note: Implant measures cannot occur (in neither group A nor group B) and the patient groups only consist of 
completed subsidy periods for the years 2010, 2011 and 2012 
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Example: reference prices 
 
Table 2.5: Cost example in SEK with yearly grant (150 SEK) and high cost protection scheme when 
reference price below 15 000 SEK 
Treatment 
Session 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Sum 
Cost for current 
treatment session 1 000 1 000 1 000 1 000 1 000 1 000 1 000 7 000 
Earlier payments 
during the 
subsidy period 0 850 1 850 2 850 3 425 3 925 4 425  
Dental care grant 150 0 0 0 0 0 0  
Final payment 
patient for 
treatment session 850 1000 1000 575 500 500 500 4 925 
Subsidy and 
grant 150 0 0 425 500 500 500 2 075 
Source: TLVFS (2011:2) 
 
Table 2.6: Cost example in SEK with yearly grant (150 SEK) and high cost protection scheme when 
reference price above 15 000 SEK 
         
Treatment 
Session 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Sum 
Cost for current 
treatment session 3 000 3 000 3 000 3 000 3 000 3 000 3 000 21 000 
Earlier payments 
during the 
subsidy period 0 2 850 4 350 5 850 7 350 8 850 9 300  
Dental care grant 150 0 0 0 0 0 0  
Final payment 
patient for 
treatment session 2850 1500 1500 1500 1500 450 450 9750 
Subsidy and 
grant 150 1500 1500 1500 1500 2550 2550 11 250 
Source: Dalin & Wolff 2013 
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9.3 Appendix 3 – Dimension of Data 
 
Table 3.1: Share if missing values for treatment 311, 342, 604 and  
605 divided on patient group and region 
 Postal code County 
Treatment A  B A B 
311 27.0 % 59.4 % 2.9 % 31.5 % 
342 15.5 % 35.2 % 1.7 % 12.5 % 
604 89.9 %  95.2 % 65.5 % 84.8 % 
605 57.1 % 72.2 % 19.7 % 49.4 % 
Source: SSIA 
 
Table 3.2:  Mean treatments in subgroups, postal code 
Treatment  A1 A2 B1 B2 
mean311 0.34 0.52 0.14 0.20 
mean342 0.72 0.94 0.38 0.44 
mean604 0.02 0.04 0.02 0.03 
mean605 0.07 0.12 0.05 0.11 
Source: SSIA 
 
Table 3.3: Mean treatment in subgroups, county 
Treatment A1 A2 B1 B2  
mean311 0.33 0.48 0.12 0.16 
mean342 0.74 0.93 0.34 0.39 
mean604 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.03 
mean605 0.05 0.09 0.04 0.08 
Source: SSIA 
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9.4 Appendix 4 – Econometrics 
 
Panel data 
The characteristic of panel data makes it possible to specify and estimate more complicated 
econometric models than with cross-sectional or time series data, and makes analyses less 
sensitive to shocks. In addition, we can investigate how variables and the relationship 
between them alter over time (Brooks, 2008). The standard regression model used in our 
paper is defined as: 
     [1] 
where is a k-dimensional vector of independent variables. The error term in panel data 
models is often assumed to be composite; , where  is believed to be 
homoskedastic, time variant and not correlated over time and  is believed to capture the 
time invariant, region specific characteristics of a region. The composite error term is 
assumed to be uncorrelated with the explanatory variable, but there may be reason to believe 
that the unobserved heterogeneity, , are correlated with the explanatory variables, which 
can lead to poor estimates.  
 
Pooled OLS 
A simple way to deal with panel data is to pool the data together and run a simple OLS. In 
doing so, the average values of the variables and the relationship between them are assumed 
to be constant over time and across regions (Brooks, 2008). The coefficients are thus assumed 
to be the same for all regions and time periods (Verbeek 2008:356). In order to achieve 
unbiasedness, consistency and efficiency when estimating Equation 1 with OLS, the usual 
Gauss-Markov assumption must hold. For instance, the independent variables must be 
uncorrelated with the error term, . However, given that we repeatedly observe 
the same observations it is unlikely that the error terms from different time periods are 
uncorrelated. This implies that the standard errors for OLS is misleading, and compared to an 
panel data estimator that exploits the correlation over time in the error term, OLS is likely to 
be inefficient (Verbeek, 2008). It is also reasonable to believe that  is correlated with , 
which makes OLS inconsistent. 
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Random Effects Model 
The Random Effects (RE) model exploits both the variation between and within regions when 
estimating the model, and assumes that both components of the error term are uncorrelated 
with the explanatory variables, i.e. that there is no unobserved heterogeneity in the data. Since 
the composite error terms possess a particular form of autocorrelation, the standard errors are 
incorrect if the RE model is estimated by the OLS estimator, as mentioned earlier. By using 
the structure of the error covariance matrix an estimator that is more efficient, called the GLS 
estimator, can be obtained (Verbeek, 2008). The GLS estimator is computed using an OLS 
estimator on a transformed version of the data, where the variables in the mean equation are 
multiplied with the variance of the error term. The transformed model is presented in equation 
2, below: 
   [2] 
where  and  
Since the variance of the components of the error terms are unknown, feasible GLS (EGLS) is 
used where the unknown variance are estimated in a first step (Verbeek, 2008). 
 
Breusch-Pagan Lagrange Multiplier test 
As argued above, the Pooled OLS model is not appropriate to use if there exists unobserved 
heterogeneity in the data. The Breusch-Pagan Lagrange multiplier test tests the null 
hypothesis of no variance in the time invariant component of the error term; 
or equivalently if  (Verbeek, 2008). If the null hypothesis 
is rejected, this implies that there exists unobserved heterogeneity and the OLS estimator is 
thus not appropriate. 
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9.5 Appendix 5 – Descriptive Statistics 
 
Table 5.1: Descriptive statistics, postal code, group B 
Variable Description Obs Mean 
Std. 
Dev. 
 
Dependent  
   
Treatment 311 Mean number if treatment 311 in cluster 571 0.16 0.13 
Treatment 342 Mean number of treatment 342 in cluster 912 0.40 0.26 
 
Independent  
   
50 % subsidy (B1) Dummy variable, equals 1 if patients in cluster is subsidized with 50 percent 1408 0.52 0.50 
85 % subsidy (B2) Dummy variable, equals 1 if patients in cluster is subsidized with 85 percent 1408 0.48 0.50 
Mean treatment Mean number of treatments in of patients in cluster 1238 9.12 1.49 
Share female Share of females in patient cluster 980 0.52 0.09 
Private Dummy variable, equals 1 if patients in cluster solely treated by private dentist 1408 0.37 0.48 
Price Mean amount of dental cost of patients in cluster within the high cost protection scheme 1238 151.85 3 749 
Practice density No. of practices per 1 000 inhabitants in postal code 1351 0.32 0.13 
Share private dentist Share of private dentists in postal code 1351 0.48 0.14 
Mean age Mean age in postal code, 2011 is used as a proxy for 2010 and 2012 1408 47.99 2.24 
Mean income Mean income in postal code, 2011 is used as a proxy for 2011 and 2012 1376 252 559 328 58 
Education Share of the adult population with tertiary or higher education in postal code, 2011 is 
used as proxy for 2010 and 2012 
1376 0.25 0.09 
Ethnicity Share of the adult population born outside of Sweden in postal code, 2011 is used as 
proxy for 2010 and 2012 
1408 0.11 0.05 
Population density Population density. 2011 is used as proxy for 2010 and 2012 1376 343.11 994.02 
Dental health Share of population in county reported to have bad or vary bad dental health. Estimated 
for postal code. 2011 used as a proxy for 2010 and 2012 
1376 9.69 1.10 
Tax rate Tax rate in county. Estimation for postal code 1394 10.63 1.29 
Dental deficit Deficit for dental care in county, pharmaceutical expenses excluded. Estimated for 
postal code. 2011 used as proxy for 2010 and 2012 
1376 12.31 16.36 
Big city Dummy variable, equals 1 if one of three major cities is located in postal code 1376 0.17 0.37 
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Table 5.2: Descriptive statistics, county, group A 
Variable Description Obs Mean 
Std. 
Dev. 
 
Dependent  
   
Treatment 311 Mean number if treatment 311 in cluster 399 0.40 0.23 
Treatment 342 Mean number of treatment 342 in cluster 404 0.83 0.35 
Treatment 605 Mean number of treatment 605 in cluster 330 0.07 0.04 
 
Independent  
   
50 % subsidy (A1) Dummy variable, equals 1 if patients in cluster is subsidized with 50 percent 411 0.50 0.50 
85 % subsidy (A2) Dummy variable, equals 1 if patients in cluster is subsidized with 85 percent 411 0.50 0.50 
Mean treatment Mean number of treatment in of patients in cluster 409 16.57 3.22 
Share female Share of females in patient cluster 408 0.45 0.07 
Private Dummy variable, equals 1 if patients in cluster solely treated by private dentist 411 0.34 0.47 
Price Mean amount of dental cost of patients in cluster within the high cost protection scheme 409 15 201 3 411 
Practice density No. of practices per 1 000 inhabitants in postal code  378 0.31 0.04 
Share private dentist Share of private dentists in postal code 378 0.49 0.09 
Mean age Mean age in postal code, 2011 is used as a proxy for 2011 and 2012 378 42.14 1.31 
Mean income Mean income in postal code, 2011 is used as a proxy for 2010 and 2012 378 230 171 9 953 
Education Share of the adult population with tertiary or higher education in postal code, 2011 is 
used as proxy for 2010 and 2012 
378 0.27 0.04 
Ethnicity Share of the adult population born outside of Sweden in postal code, 2011 is used as 
proxy for 2010 and 2012 
378 0.12 0.04 
Dental health Share of population in county reported to have bad or vary bad dental health. Estimated 
for postal code. 2011 used as a proxy for 2010 and 2012 
378 9.67 1.52 
Tax rate Tax rate in county. Estimation for postal code 378 32.19 0.88 
Dental deficit Deficit for dental care in county, pharmaceutical expenses excluded. Estimated for 
postal code. 2011 used as proxy for 2010 and 2012 
378 8.33 14.01 
Big city Dummy variable, equals 1 if one of three major cities is located in postal code 378 0.14 0.35 
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Table 5.3: Descriptive statistics, county, group B 
Variable Description Obs Mean 
Std. 
Dev. 
 
Dependent  
   
Treatment 311 Mean number if treatment 311 in cluster 280 0.14 0.11 
Treatment 342 Mean number of treatment 342 in cluster 358 0.36 0.17 
Treatment 605 Mean number of treatment 605 in cluster 207 0.06 0.03 
 
Independent  
   
50 % subsidy (B1) Dummy variable, equals 1 if patients in cluster is subsidized with 50 percent 409 0.50 0.50 
85 % subsidy (B2) Dummy variable, equals 1 if patients in cluster is subsidized with 85 percent 409 0.50 0.50 
Mean treatment Mean number of treatments in of patients in cluster 400 9.54 1.61 
Share female Share of females in patient cluster 365 0.53 0.08 
Private Dummy variable, equals 1 if patients in cluster solely treated by private dentist 409 0.34 0.47 
Price Mean amount of dental cost of patients in cluster within the high cost protection scheme  400 15 567 3 770 
Practice density No. of practices per 1 000 inhabitants in postal code 377 0.31 0.04 
Share private dentist Share of private dentists in postal code 377 0.49 0.09 
Mean age Mean age in postal code. 2011 is used as a proxy for 2011 and 2012 377 42.14 1.31 
Mean income Mean income in postal code. 2011 is used as a proxy for 2010 and 2012 377 230 218 9 924 
Education Share of the adult population with tertiary or higher education in postal code, 2011 is 
used as proxy for 2010 and 2012 
377 0.27 0.04 
Ethnicity Share of the adult population born outside of Sweden in postal code. 2011 is used as 
proxy for 2010 and 2012 
377 0.12 0.04 
Dental health Share of population in county reported to have bad or vary bad dental health Estimated 
for postal code. 2011 used as a proxy for 2010 and 2012 
377 9.67 1.53 
Tax rate Tax rate in county. Estimation for postal code 377 32.19 0.88 
Dental deficit Deficit for dental care in county, pharmaceutical expenses excluded. Estimated for 
postal code. 2011 used as proxy for 2010 and 2012 
377 8.35 14.03 
Big city Dummy variable, equals 1 if one of three major cities is located in postal code 377 0.14 0.35 
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9.6 Appendix 6 – Results  
 
Table 6.1: Regression results from RE and OLS model, county, group A 
Dependent variable log of mean number of treatment 311 and 342 in a cluster. 
 RE_311 RE_342    RE_605 OLS_311 OLS_342 OLS_605    
  robust s.e. robust s.e. robust s.e. robust s.e. robust s.e. robust s.e. 
85 % subsidy (A2) -0.514 0.365 0.481 -0.262 0.460 0.382    
 (0.59) (0.41) (0.69) (0.63) (0.44) (0.82)    
Share female (log) 0.414* 0.103 0.253 0.242 0.012 0.711***  
 (0.21) (0.18) (0.24) (0.20) (0.17) (0.24)    
Mean treatments (log) 2.654*** 1.140*** 1.480 3.789*** 1.101** 1.434    
 (0.74) (0.44) (0.95) (0.75) (0.45) (0.89)    
Price (log) -0.217 -1.340 -0.995 -1.727 -1.534 -0.639    
 (1.42) (1.04) (1.91) (1.61) (1.14) (2.18)    
Mean age  11.696 26.602*** 3.409 12.008 23.840*** 19.794    
 (8.84) (5.94) (13.22) (8.78) (5.40) (12.31)    
Mean age 2  -13.632 -31.237*** -3.804 -13.999 -27.980*** -23.040    
 (10.41) (6.99) (15.53) (10.33) (6.35) (14.46)    
Ethnicity (log) 2.389*** -0.578* -0.259 2.358*** -0.595** -0.736    
 (0.57) (0.30) (0.70) (0.50) (0.28) (0.61)    
Tax rate (log) 4.628 0.308 -4.689* 5.592 -0.244 -6.383    
 (3.86) (2.15) (2.65) (3.46) (2.26) (3.93)    
Education -3.095 4.304*** 0.506 -1.471 3.809** 1.866    
 (2.70) (1.66) (3.40) (2.33) (1.54) (3.01)    
Mean income (log) -14.277*** 4.767* 3.566 -14.408*** 5.332*** 5.387    
 (4.62) (2.50) (4.17) (3.44) (2.03) (3.66)    
Big city  1.571*** 0.460* 0.428 1.540*** 0.408* 0.819    
 (0.45) (0.25) (0.47) (0.35) (0.21) (0.51)    
Share private dentist -3.970 7.836*** -0.933 -3.476 7.683*** 1.633    
 (2.88) (1.63) (3.46) (2.52) (1.48) (2.72)    
Practise density (log) -2.171** -2.924*** 0.836 -2.517*** -2.731*** -0.335    
 (0.92) (0.60) (1.41) (0.89) (0.55) (1.14)    
Private -0.038 -0.243*** 0.184 0.063 -0.251*** 0.212**   
 (0.12) (0.05) (0.12) (0.10) (0.05) (0.10)    
Dental deficit (log) -0.444*** 0.151** -0.015 -0.430*** 0.152** 0.025    
 (0.12) (0.07) (0.13) (0.09) (0.06) (0.10)    
Dental health (log) 1.024** -0.569** -0.551 1.061*** -0.620*** -0.747*   
 (0.41) (0.23) (0.44) (0.32) (0.19) (0.40)    
cons -92.490 
-
625.234*** -99.236 -91.077 
-
569.391*** -471.110*    
  (177.95) (129.77) (290.70) (200.00) (122.96) (268.10) 
sigma_u 0.28 0.15 0.32    
sigma_e 0.34 0.23 0.30    
rho 0.40 0.29 0.54    
Breusch-Page LM-test 0.000 0.003 0.001       
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 43 
 
 
 
 
Table 6.2: Regression results from RE and OLS model, county, group B 
Dependent variable log of mean number of treatment 311 and 342 in a cluster. 
 RE_311 RE_342    OLS_311 OLS_342 
  robust s.e. robust s.e. robust s.e. robust s.e. 
85 % subsidy (B2) 0.805 0.296 1.098 0.207    
 (0.56) (0.52) (0.76) (0.56)    
Share female (log) -0.040 -0.425*** 0.232 -0.380**   
 (0.33) (0.16) (0.33) (0.17)    
Mean treatments (log) 2.865*** 2.285*** 2.757*** 2.235*** 
 (0.45) (0.37) (0.45) (0.32)    
Price (log) -2.563** -1.472 -3.187* -1.294    
 (1.26) (1.23) (1.67) (1.25)    
Mean age 25.810** 25.524*** 22.791** 26.452*** 
 (11.18) (8.19) (11.49) (6.99)    
Mean age 2 -29.991** -29.809*** -26.421* -30.885*** 
 (13.16) (9.65) (13.49) (8.22)    
Ethnicity (log) 1.375** -0.537 1.193** -0.364    
 (0.53) (0.46) (0.51) (0.37)    
Tax rate (log) -9.359* -7.444** -9.194* -7.678**   
 (5.47) (2.88) (5.22) (3.21)    
Education -4.467 -0.333 -3.812 -1.184    
 (3.54) (3.01) (3.56) (2.42)    
Mean income (log) -10.532** 2.874 -9.060*** 1.998    
 (4.08) (3.44) (3.40) (2.71)    
Big city  1.897*** 1.272*** 1.767*** 1.412*** 
 (0.55) (0.35) (0.48) (0.30)    
Share private dentist -2.439 2.336 -1.075 1.679    
 (2.81) (2.68) (2.64) (2.08)    
Practise density (log) -2.482** -2.152** -2.820* -2.117***  
 (0.97) (0.96) (1.08) (0.74)    
Private -0.102 -0.189*** -0.109 -0.172*** 
 (0.10) (0.06) (0.08) (0.05)    
Dental deficit (log) -0.411*** -0.103 -0.366*** -0.144    
 (0.15) (0.12) (0.12) (0.09)    
Dental health (log) 1.252*** -0.685** 1.173*** -0.620**   
 (0.40) (0.32) (0.36) (0.26)    
cons -376.394 
-
551.192*** -326.564 
-
560.217*** 
  (233.26) (186.76) (251.41) (163.16)    
sigma_u 0.30 0.22   
sigma_e 0.35 0.28   
rho 0.42 0.39   
Breusch-Pagen LM-test 0.000 0.000     
 
 
 
 
